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A semiotic view of Dewey’s times AnD 
HAbermAs's lifeworlDs
steve mackey
AbstrAct: John Dewey (1859-1952) explained how life was ‘corporatised’ at the time of rampant, 
laissez faire capitalism in early 20th century America. this paper refers Dewey’s observations to 
Habermas’s notions of the colonisation of the lifeworld. the semiotic and pragmatist approaches 
of charles saunders Peirce are then enlisted to look further into these lifeworld changes. the 
paper suggests modifications to Habermas’s schema to bring it more in line with Dewey’s empirical 
account. it puts together a theoretically and empirically informed picture of the contemporary 
disruption to ways of living and the accompanying social and political instability. the paper 
then goes on to suggest how that instability appears to have been quelled by communicative 
means. these stages of: (1) stability; (2) disruption/instability; and (3) the regaining of stability are 
compared to Habermas’s notions of: (1) an original lifeworld; (2) colonisation of that lifeworld by 
the consequences of purposive rational activity; then (3) communicative action which ‘rebuilds’—
that is which replaces or modifies or reforms or repairs—the disrupted lifeworld in order to 
create a new lifeworld. ‘colonisation’ could be said to have provoked social instability. notions of 
building a new ‘lifeworld’—a new cultural and psychic reference—could be said to correspond 
with attempts to resume social and political stability. the implication is that whatever the degree 
of purposive rationalism there is always a need for a return to some level of shared values and 
understandings which imply communicative rationality. this ‘return’ or ‘counter-colonisation’ 
can be thought of as operating via a ‘lifeworld negotiation’ which might best be understood with 
reference to a Peircean based pragmatism-semiotic theory of human subjectivity. this paper 
has been criticised for discussing “arguments” which: “would justify those who accommodated 
themselves to nazism.” what this paper in fact tries to do is to use the concepts of the above three 
philosophers to try to account for the ways people think. this paper is not about justifying what 
philosophies people should hold. it is presumed that most readers are sensible and ethical and can 
make their own minds up in that respect. rather it attempts to draw from Dewey, Habermas 
and Peirce to offer a characterisation of what philosophies might be argued to be held and to offer 
an explanation about how these modes of thinking might be said to have come into existence. 
this paper rejects the notion that ones ‘will’ and thus the way one is able to think, is totally free 
and beyond the formative influences of the social-cultural context—including the influences of 
public relations and other persuasive discourse industries.
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Dewey’s clAim tHAt life wAs ‘corPorAtiseD’  
Dewey wrote: “there is no word which adequately express what is taking place… the 
United states has steadily moved from an earlier pioneer individualism to a condition 
of dominant corporateness” (Dewey 1930:36). for Dewey this “corporateness” was as-
sociated with the “stagnation of rural districts” as well as “excess and restless movement 
in cities” (Dewey 1930:58-59). corporateness, i.e. the end of individualism involved: “…
the formation of a collectivistic scheme of interdependence [in] every cranny of life.” 
Personal life was now collective; intellectual life was now collective; emotional life was 
now collective; leisure and work life now had more collective qualities as did morals and 
economics (Dewey 1930:47-49). for Dewey corporatism overturned individualism be-
cause it brought “men” (sic) together: “on the one side by investment in the same joint 
stock company, and on the other hand by the fact that the machine compels mass pro-
duction in order that investors may get their profits” (Dewey 1930:58-59). Dewey com-
pares “individualism” to “corporateness” in order: “…to indicate the decay of the older 
conceptions, although they are still those that are most loudly and vocally professed, the 
illustrations given inevitably emphasise those features of growing standardisation and 
mass uniformity which critics justly deplore.” (Dewey 1930:48). 
the major pathology of the corporate life according to Dewey is its leaders’ lack of 
moral compass. their social values dissolve in a morass of economic rationalisation:
…even those who seem to be in control and to carry the expression of  their 
special individual abilities to a high pitch are submerged. They may be captains of  
finance and industry, but until there is some consensus of  belief  as to the meaning 
of  finance and industry in civilisation as a whole, they cannot be captains of  their 
own souls—their beliefs and aims… their business is private and its outcome is 
private profit. No complete satisfaction is possible where such a split exists. Hence 
the absence of  a sense of  social value is made up for by an exacerbated acceleration 
of  the activities that increase private advantage and power. One cannot look into 
the inner consciousness of  his fellows; but if  there is any general degree of  inner 
contentment on the part of  those who form our pecuniary oligarchy, the evidence 
is sadly lacking. As for the many, they are impelled hither and yon by forces beyond 
their control. (Dewey 1930:53-54)
Dewey reproaches a handmaiden of this social condition: the “publicity agent”—
the current day public relations practitioner or ‘spin doctor’: 
The publicity agent is perhaps the most significant symbol of  our present social 
life. There are individuals who resist; but, for a time at least, sentiment can be 
manufactured by mass methods for almost any person or cause…I should suppose 
that the more intelligent of  those who wield the publicity agencies which produce 
conformity would be disturbed at beholding their own success. (Dewey 1930:43-
86) 
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Dewey’s life AnD times
Dewey lived through some of the worst domestic excesses of Us capitalism. Although 
the first decade of the 20th century was relatively affluent, it followed two decades of 
social and economic dislocation. this was the period when the original “captains of 
industry”, the original “millionaires” with names such as rockefeller, carnegie, J. P. 
morgan and vanderbilt made their fortunes by creating big industrial trusts or con-
glomerates. the conglomerates accelerated America’s development but made many 
small business people, artisans and small farmers into factory workers and farm labour-
ers. modern technology and the concentration of power and wealth into the hands of 
a relatively small number of large corporations took power away from individuals of all 
classes who had a tradition of fierce independence within a culture influenced by reli-
gious freedom and rebellion against the british. the faded symbols of that old culture 
still exist in political iconography to do with individualism and freedom. the notion of 
‘rugged individualism’ is exemplified in Us President from 1929 to 1933 Herbert Hoo-
ver’s 1928 speech: 
when the war closed the most vital of all issues was whether Governments should 
continue war ownership and operation of many instrumentalities of production and 
distribution. we were challenged with the choice of the American system - rugged in-
dividualism - or the choice of a european system of diametrically opposed doctrines -- 
doctrines of paternalism and state socialism. (Hoover 1928)
one consequence of the collision of a stern industrial discipline with keenly individ-
ualistic ideals was the genesis of a wide variety of radical political organisations:
…this social ferment included, among others, the Grange, the Greenbackers, the 
Knights of  Labour, the Populist Party, militant craft and industrial unions, utopian 
societies, and socialist parties and organisations. (Bowman 1995:77) 
some of these organisations were trade union or other left wing inspired organisations. 
the knights of labour included radical small businesspeople and lawyers (egbert, Per-
sons et al. 1952:236). the socialists experienced a “golden age” between 1902 and 1912 
with 125,826 American members in the socialist Party in 1912. that year there were 
said to be 56 socialist Party mayors in local authorities and a socialist Party congress-
man in new york state (egbert, Persons et al. 1952:283). the socialist Party candidate 
for President in that year, eugene Debs won 897,011 votes or about 6 per cent (fitrakis 
1993:93). Debs was imprisoned in 1919 for making an alleged seditious speech in 1918 
but still attracted 915,000 votes when he fought the 1920 election from his prison cell 
(ibid).  the mood of the time is explained by eric Goldman in Rendezvous with Destiny:
By 1900 more than one third of  American farmers did not work their own acres. 
The big factory dominated the industrial scene to such an extent that only the 
most optimistic employee still dreamed of  owning his own plant…one per cent of  
the population owned more than the remaining ninety-nine per cent put together. 
[This was] especially menacing to the small entrepreneur (Goldman 1952:72).
Adding to the confusion conservative newspapers railed against a seemingly inevita-
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ble Government control or take-over of these super-concentrated, monopoly owned in-
dustries. they saw such a take-over as threatening the end of free enterprise, replacing it 
with a de facto “state socialism” (Goldman 1952:73). the resulting political compromise 
was the creation of “Progressivism” which we will come to below. 
Dewey was writing about this loss of ‘individualism’ in the 1920s, but (Hartz) (1955) 
suggests America had lost its “American revolution / thomas Paine / lafayette” brand 
of revolutionary individualism by the time of the Paris commune… the insurrection of 
Paris against the french government in 1871. Hartz points out that the Paris commune 
was not supported in contemporary American newspaper editorials.  Hartz says that 
this conservatism was in contrast to the earlier 19th century findings of De tocqueville 
who chronicled what he saw as a locally based, genuine democracy both in the political 
and economic sense in his 1835 book Democracy in America (bottomore 1969:20). Ameri-
cans continued with a romantic notion of the frontiersman and the “land of the free”, 
but as discussed above, technology and “trust style capitalism” (the big corporations) 
overcame the simple localised modes of employment and styles of living well before the 
end of the 19th century. Dewey writing in the 1920s attributes American individuality 
not to revolutionary history but to the Us heritage of religious notions of an individ-
ual soul, although he says the church link ceased to be conscious by the 20th century 
(Dewey 1931:71).  Discussing mueller freienfel’s characterisation of the ‘new American’ 
Dewey writes:
…what are alleged to be the characteristics of  the type? Fundamentally they 
spring from impersonality. The roots of  the intellect are unconscious and vital, in 
instincts and emotions. In America we are told this subconscious is disregarded: it 
is suppressed or is subordinated to conscious rationality, which means it is adapted 
to the needs and conditions of  the external world. We have “intellect,” but distinctly 
in the Bergsonian sense; mind attuned to the conditions of  action upon matter, 
upon the world. Our emotional life is quick, excitable, undiscriminating, lacking 
in individuality and in direction by intellectual life. Hence the “externality and 
superficiality of  the American soul”; it has no ultimate inner unity and uniqueness 
- no true personality…I shall not deny the existence of  these characteristics. 
(Dewey 1931:25-27)
Dewey agrees with this lamentable analysis. He wrote that “Americanisation”—
this change of the soul in a way which facilitates the instrumentalism of the big corpo-
ration—was spreading out from America to other parts of the world.  “Americanisa-
tion” was in essence the “quantification, mechanisation and standardisation” of the new 
American way of life (Dewey 1931:29). this new way of regulated life is modelled on the 
success of the big corporations which by the 1930s had won the acceptance of the public 
at large. this acceptance was assisted by the ideological effects of two decades of public 
relations including massive government generate patriotic propaganda during the first 
world war (cutlip); (ewen); (bernays); (Hiebert); (Pimlott); (lasswell). war propaganda 
was organised by the ‘committee on Public information’ also called the ‘creel com-
mittee’.  by the 1930s corporations were no longer the target of the pre-war ‘muckrak-
ers’ and trust busters who had exposed excesses such as the shooting of strikers in the 
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‘ludlow massacre’ (1914)—in which the rockefeller dynasty was implicated; negligent 
railway passenger deaths; and appalling hygiene standards in the meat packing indus-
try. it was certainly a confused and confusing time. However, can we now agree with 
Dewey that: “there is no word which adequately expresses what is [was] taking place.” 
(Dewey, 1931:36)?
HAbermAs’s ‘lifeworlD’
well of course now we do have words which can be offered to adequately express what 
was taking place. these are words such as: ‘lifeworld’; ‘purposive rationalism’; ‘ford-
ism’; and ‘taylorism’. taylorism is the label applied to the measurement and manage-
ment of the efficiency of workers. taylorism was developed and instituted in the early 
years of the 20th century. fordism is the application of efficiency measures to industrial 
production. Purposive rationalism is a term particularly used by weber, Parsons and 
Habermas. As used by Habermas, purposive rationalism involves the organisation of 
people’s thinking habits in ways which inter alia achieve fordist and taylorist goals. for 
Habermas, purposive rational and instrumental thinking contrasts with communica-
tive rationality with its validity claims aimed at forming an agreed consensus on reality. 
communicative rationalism involves an awareness consequent of an ability of people 
to draw on the cultural understandings of their own communities. this is as opposed 
to an awareness prioritised, and thus somewhat confined and directed, by immediate 
economic necessity. for Habermas communicative rationalism is the result of strategic 
influences created by interests who want to harness the ways particular communities 
behave and think. in Habermassian terms, if shielded from strategic communication, 
communities think with the conceptual abilities facilitated by: internalised narratives; 
examples of what is reasonable; and the commonsense which is available in their ‘life-
world.’ the concept of ‘lifeworld’ or lebenswelt arose with edmund Husserl (1859-1938). 
Husserl use the term to conceptualise the way consciousness of the world might be pos-
sible in terms of a philosophy of phenomenology as opposed to via a ‘transcendental ap-
perception’ which he attributes to kant:
In this world we are objects among objects in the sense of  the life-world, namely, 
as being here and there, in the plain certainty of  experience, before anything 
that is established scientifically…we are subjects for this world namely, as the ego 
subjects experiencing it, contemplating it, valuing it…this surrounding world 
has only the ontic meaning given to it by our experiencing, our thoughts, our 
valuations etc…   (Husserl 1970:105):
Habermas’s The Theory of  Communicative Action (Habermas 1984) is in line with the 
‘linguistic turn’. Habermas reinterprets Husserl’s “lifeworld” as to do with a notion of an 
ontology created and presented in a cultural and linguistic manner. this is instead of a 
notion of ontology conjured up via Husserl’s intuitive-psychological conceptualisation: 
“the ontic meaning given to it by our experiencing” and as “ego subjects experiencing”. 
what appears to be our social and natural world by immediate “experience” to Hus-
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serl is for Habermas an equally ‘obvious’ world. but Habermas’s lifeworld is a world 
made obvious in a manner mediated by the linguistic and symbolic culture which we 
live within. this Habermassian lifeworld is limited and shaped by the ‘horizons’—that 
is the limitations or the qualities of our particular culture and our particular quality and 
degree of education and enculturation within that particular culture. once we are lin-
guistically and symbolically enculturated reality is thought from within that encultura-
tion and the horizons which limit and shape our culturally facilitated conceptualisa-
tion ability. the advantage of a Habermassian lifeworld over a Husserlian lifeworld is 
the implication that the former allows for interpersonal dialectical exchange of validity 
claims. validity claims are limited in the manner of a “universal pragmatics”. that is, 
there is a limit on the ways humans must communicate in order to make sense to each 
other.  Differing validity claims, provided they are couched within universal pragmatics, 
would facilitate non pathological, potentially democratic plural perspectives on reality. 
the notion of universal pragmatics and validity claims allows for, as it were, natural, we 
might say wholesome changes of ‘mind’ or understanding in response to changing, or 
changable physical and political circumstances:
In everyday communicative practice there are no completely unfamiliar situations. 
Every new situation appears in a lifeworld composed of  a cultural stock of  
knowledge that is “always already familiar”. Communicative actors can no more 
take up an extramundane1 position in relation to their lifeworld than they can in 
relation to language as the medium for the processes of  reaching understanding 
through which their lifeworld maintains itself. In drawing upon a cultural tradition 
they also continue it. The category of  the lifeworld has then a different status than 
the normal world concepts dealt with above. Together with criticisable validity 
claims these latter concepts form the frame of, or categorical scaffolding that serves 
to order problematic situations, that is situations that need to be agreed upon in a 
lifeworld that is already substantially interpreted. (Habermas 1989:125)
Habermas then goes on to expound a theory of what he calls the “colonisation” of 
this lifeworld. if the lifeworld—the basis for understanding—is composed of a plurality 
and a democracy of discursively expressed validity claims then it must always be at risk 
of capture by particular interests. it is at risk of capture because it is always discursively 
created—as opposed to intuitively experienced a la the Husserlian schema. Purposive 
rationality may sweep aside a discourse derived from a plurality of validity claims which 
respond to a universal pragmatics—an agreed way of reaching civilised human accord. 
such purposive rationality is implicit in Dewey’s passage about ‘men’ brought together: 
“on the one side by investment in the same joint stock company, and on the other hand 
by the fact that the machine compels mass production in order that investors may get 
their profits.” (Dewey 1930:58-59) in the sense that:
…success-oriented action steered by egocentric calculations of  utility loses its 
connection to action oriented by mutual understanding. This strategic action, 
which is disengaged from the mechanism of  reaching understanding …is promoted 
to the model for methodically dealing with scientifically objectivated nature…
Culture loses just those formal properties that enable it to take on ideological 
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functions…In the end systemic mechanisms suppress forms of  social interaction 
even in those areas where a consensus dependent coordination of  action cannot 
be replaced, that is, where the symbolic reproduction of  the lifeworld is at stake. 
In these areas the mediatisation of  the lifeworld assumes the form of  colonisation. 
(Habermas 1984:196) (vol.2)
the implication of Habermas is that discourse arising from communicative interac-
tion in human culture provides the basis from which people are able to understand and 
interpret their world. Applying this theory to the world as Dewey saw it a number of 
points might be made: Dewey’s description coincides with the notion that previous com-
munal discourse for how life should be understood and lived were being overturned, or 
at least disrupted, by norms of behaviour resulting from a rapid change to a harsh form 
of capitalist industrialisation. However the inevitability of such a colonisation is prob-
lematised by the fact that at the end of the 19th century it produced a significant back-
lash among conscious and politically organised groups which implicitly still retained 
previous lifeworld conceptualisation. this backlash was eventually mollified by a proc-
ess involving the consensus politics of the ‘Progressive movement.’ walter lippmann the 
author of the ground breaking, originally 1922 book: Public Opinion, (lippmann 1965) as 
well as one of the main founders of what is now known as public relations: ivy ledbet-
ter lee, were leading figures in this movement. they were among a new sophisticated 
politically conscious profession which helped to re-write the discourse—literally: expo-
nents of the new science of public opinion and exponents of public relations analysed 
how people thought en masse, then they wrote the speeches and alternative policies for 
corporation bosses and politicians in order to meet and deflect negative discourses. the 
Progressive movement offered alternative validity claims which allowed a new lifeworld 
to come into existence. this is largely the, what might be termed: ‘capitalist-welfare-
consensus’ lifeworld which the Us and most of the ‘west’ has now. the origin and work 
of the Progressive movement is another story which will not be expanded upon here. 
its creation and activities suggest the need for a concept of what might be referred to 
as ‘lifeworld negotiation.’ Perhaps a concept of lifeworld negotiation should be inserted 
into the Habermassian schema. it is this schema which we will try to develop with ref-
erence to Peirce’s ideas. 
APPlyinG Peirce to Dewey AnD HAbermAs
A theory of ‘lifeworld negotiation’ may be constructed from Peirce’s notions of semiot-
ics; the pragmatic maxim; and his use of the concept of ‘habit’. A theory of ‘lifeworld 
negotiation’ would discuss how thinking can be changed in a manner which avoids 
Habermas’s rigid dichotomy of either community based communicative rationality or in-
strumentally motivated, pathologically burdened strategic rationality. in How to make our 
ideas clear Peirce gives an account of his ‘pragmatic maxim’. the maxim is summarised 
elsewhere in this way: 
Pragmaticism was originally announced in the form of  a maxim, as follows: 
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Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive 
the objects of  your conception to have. Then, your conception of  those effects is 
the whole of  your conception of  the object.
I will restate this in other words…The entire intellectual purport of  any symbol 
consists in the total of  all general modes of  rational conduct which, conditionally 
upon all the different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance 
of  the symbol. (Peirce, Weiss et al. 1974) (Vol 5.438)
Peirce is saying that it is our historical experiences of each signification and our 
habits of mind influenced by those experiences which determine any of the many roles 
which that signification may play in our thinking processes. that is, Peirce is alluding to 
a far more complex concept than the notion of a single idea being derived from the sign 
which stands for a single object. rather he is involving the third point of his approach—
the interpretant—which involves the splitting of the signification into its multifaceted 
‘significances’ for the thinker. by multifaceted significances we should understand the 
host of many ways, with many consequences, that the object can be considered when 
its sign is ruminated upon. Peirce’s competitor for the title of originator of pragmatism: 
william James signals this indeterminacy of the meaning of any one sign when he em-
phasises the motivational aspect about how particular ‘rational conduct’ i.e. ‘reasons’, or 
‘truths’ are desired and chosen:
Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and beliefs 
“pass,” so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank notes pass so long as 
nobody refuses them. (Menand and James 1997:117)
what Peirce, James and the rest of the ‘pragmatism’ tradition as sampled in  menand 
(1997) imply is that the best, most practical, most pragmatic, most verifiable, most useful 
notions of truth cannot be arrived at via absolute ‘certainties’ or abstract notions. Un-
shakable, certain knowledge is not attained through religious revelation. neither can it 
be achieved meta-philosophically via systems of reasoning such as those proposed by 
philosophers including Descartes, kant, and Hegel. nor can truth—which is relevant to 
contemporary circumstances—be deduced using the empiricism of David Hume or by 
mathematical or other logical deduction or induction whether using special or ordinary 
languages. Pragmatism implies that meta-philosophical, empirical and logical reason-
ing approaches are valuable thinking methods. However, of far more importance for 
Peirce’s pragmatism is the actual conceptualising process itself. that is Peirce was not 
so concerned with the different varieties of concepts of philosophers. He was more con-
cerned with how they created those concepts or how indeed any concepts or any ideas 
are created. they are created in a semiotic/pragmatic manner rather than by reason-
ing and/or defending or attacking modes of reasoning, which is implicit in Habermas’s 
schema. counter to Habermas’s positing of some ‘natural’ or inevitably universal prag-
matics which must be the womb of any human-style reasoning, Peirce takes one step 
back and concerns himself more with reasoning per se. He is concerned with the process 
of reasoning. this is what Peirce’s semiotics is all about. Peirce’s semiotics is a thesis on, 
in his view, the always inevitably imperfect construction of always inevitably imperfect 
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knowledge which is then tested against an inevitable and undeniable real world:
Logic, in its general sense is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for 
semiotic, the quasi-necessary or formal, doctrine of  signs. By describing the 
doctrine as “quasi-necessary,” or formal, I mean that we observe the characters 
of  such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will 
not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements eminently fallible and 
therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what must be the characters of  
all signs used by a “scientific” intelligence, that is to say by an intelligence capable 
of  learning by experience. (Peirce, Weiss et al. 1974) (Vol 2.227).
the above section should be read in conjunction with the start of the following 
section: 
A sign or representamen…creates in the mind…an equivalent sign or interpretant 
of  the first sign…[which] stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference 
to a sort of  idea which I have sometimes call the ground of  the representamen.” 
(Peirce, Weiss et al. 1974) (Vol 2.228)
Here Peirce is emphasising the vulnerability of thinking. He is saying that we can only 
ever know the world from the store of understanding potentialities which we internal-
ise as signs. we constantly pick from the potentialities of these understandings and con-
stantly revise and adjust our semiotically derived view of the world in response to how 
certain of the truths which seemed apparent are in fact reacted upon by cold, hard ex-
perience. this is not usually a conscious intellectual or detached academic process of 
thought. it is not a dialectical contest of validity claims within some sort of universal 
pragmatic set of rules for human discourse. on the contrary, most of the time this proc-
ess actually is thought—i.e. what has just been described is a description of how think-
ing takes place. it is not a description of the ground rules by which thought might take 
place. Husserl says something similar:   
When we proceed philosophising with Kant, not by starting from his beginning 
and moving forward in his paths but by enquiring back into what was thus taken 
for granted (that of  which Kantian thinking, like everyone’s thinking, makes use as 
unquestioned and available), when we become conscious of  it as “presuppositions” 
and accord these their own universal and theoretical interests, there opens up to 
us, to our astonishment, an infinity of  ever new phenomena belonging to a new 
dimension, coming to light only through consistent penetration into the meaning  
and validity implications of  what was thus taken for granted—an infinity, because 
continued penetration shows that every phenomenon obtained through this 
unfolding of  meaning, given at first in the lifeworld as obviously existing, itself  
contains meaning and validity implications whose exposition leads again to new 
phenomena and so on. These are purely subjective phenomena throughout, but 
not merely facts involving psychological processes of  sense-data; rather they are 
mental processes which, as such, exercise with essential necessity the function of  
constituting forms of  meaning. But they constitute them in each case out of   mental 
“material” which [itself] proves in turn, with essential necessity to be mental form, 
i.e. to be constituted; just as any newly developed form [of  meaning]  is destined 
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to become material, namely, to function in the constitution of  [some new] form.  
(Husserl 1970:111-112)
similar to Peirce, Husserl finds thinking to be a very complex process of building 
on and challenging what is already in the mind. the challenge comes from new mental 
impulses. Husserl starts with presuppositions. these presuppositions are challenged and 
activated into a process of new ideas creation when we become aware of our presuppo-
sitions’ “universal and theoretical interests”—i.e. when we become aware of what made 
us pre-suppose. when we become aware of the way “validity implications” can chal-
lenge our preconceptions “an infinity” of thinking possibilities opens up. this thinking 
has to be organised through the: “mental processes which, as such, exercise with essen-
tial necessity the function of constituting forms of meaning.” in other words particular 
ranges of thoughts have to be relied upon and adhered to in order to maintain cohesive 
ideas and sanity. this latter controlling mechanism is equivalent to the notions of expe-
rience and habits of thought—the empirical testing and comparing of thought against 
pragmatic reality—which is central to the Peircean schema. new awareness that pre-
suppositions are not reality but mere supposition is equivalent to the interpretant receiv-
ing new signification which is so radical that this signification cannot but alter, revise, 
or change that interpretant. that is, in Peirce previous thinking and thus by implication 
previous subjectivity—i.e. who we are—changes as we realign our thoughts to new un-
derstandings of reality. 
on a day to day basis unreflective thinking process seems to serve the immediate 
requirements of everyday life. At its extreme however, the consequences of such unre-
flective thinking may lead to pathology. what Habermas refers to as colonisation of 
the lifeworld may be seen as an example of such pathology. in Husserlian or Peircean 
terms we might talk about the colonisation of the lifeworld as the state of thought when 
re-supposition or re-signification of the interpretant has proceeded outside the bounds 
of respectively: the ability of the subject or community in its “essential necessity [in] 
constituting forms of meaning” or beyond the bounds of pragmatic reasoning. if under-
standings break free of the human ability to manage or pragmatically test them “prag-
matic reality” may only return after the salutary experiences of pathologies such as war 
or environmental disaster. in the Us domestic circumstances of the late 19th—early 
20th century Dewey is depicting a similar pathological break between presumptions 
or understandings and pragmatic reality in terms of how society, including its leaders, 
could understand their raison d’etre. change had been so rapid and so disruptive of previ-
ous modes of thinking, i.e. previous lifeworld circumstances, that ‘presumptions’ in the 
Husserlian sense or the interpretant in the Peircian sense were radically disrupted for 
many. Different classes of people from the millionaires to artisans, farmers, small busi-
ness people and professionals were working to, or having to come to terms with, very dif-
ferent presumptions and understandings of their lives. it was left to the ‘publicity agents’ 
in alliance with consensus politicians to realign government and corporate policies in 
ways which re-normalised economic and social circumstances, or at least explained 
them in a re-normalised way by steering the astonishment of presumptions (Husserl), 
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or by re-signifying with publicity work the sorts of life it was normal to lead (Peirce). 
this re-imaging of the sorts of lives it was right for people to lead—the re-tooling of 
people’s understandings of their worlds—could be described as the ‘negotiation’ or ‘re-
negotiation’ of  the lifeworld. it involved the deliberate manufacture of communicative 
artefacts—speeches, newspaper publicity, and government bills (such as anti-trust legis-
lation) to reconfigure the: “cultural stock of knowledge that is ‘always already familiar’” 
(Habermas). And it is this early 20th century renegotiation of the Us lifeworld which 
dominates the west, and western-style political culture today. 
most people do not battle and fight every day of the week in an attempt to reach a 
pristine, irreproachable ‘true’ understanding. we do not concern ourselves on a day to 
day basis with the, veracity, verity or morality of everything that we think or everything 
that we do. instead consciously, semi-consciously or quite unconsciously we take the 
bulk of our understandings, including our perception of the limits to challenging those 
understandings, from our surrounding lifeworld. we acquiesce into a feeling that ‘life is 
just like that’. it is hard to see how we could do otherwise—except in the rare, special-
ised and rather ambiguous occasions of particular academic-intellectual initiatives—in-
itiatives which just do not fit into everyday life. i am using a combination of Peirce and 
Habermas’s here to indicate a notion of ‘lifeworld’ in the sense of the human culture-in-
frastructure which supports our thinking subjectivities. this is a cultural infrastructure 
which supports who we are in terms of our conscious and unconscious existence. the 
lifeworld is a complex amalgam of material and associated ideological social infrastruc-
ture. we are the subjective creation from the multi-millennia-long development of these 
lifeworlds of which the present century version is only a chapter. it is a rupture in these 
processes of subjectivity formation which Dewey is writing about in the example above. 
He is writing about a time when semiotic revision, or in his terms the reconstruction 
of the ‘soul’ - was not able to keep pace with empirical checking. At the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th Us economics, politics and various cultural and 
historical mores were changing too fast. they are changing too fast in terms of Peirce’s 
suggestion that: “…what must be the characters of all signs used by a “scientific” in-
telligence, that is to say by an intelligence capable of learning by experience.” People 
and their institutions just could not keep up. truths about how life could or should be 
led were suffering a miss-match between experiential, experimental, ‘quasi-scientific’ 
or commonsense verification of what seemed to be the case in comparison with what 
was retained in the interpretants of people’s minds as to what being American was and 
what their lives were. who people were just did not seem to be a concept aligned with 
what they had to be—hence the consequent reshaping, in fact the “Americanisation” as 
Dewey calls it in more than one place of that nation’s “souls”.
conclUsion
this paper draws attention to the congruence between the concrete changes in peo-
ple’s lives depicted by Dewey in early 20th century America and Habermas’s lifeworld 
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theory. it has then suggested a meta-explanation in Peircian terms about how subjectiv-
ity can be argued to be created which is relevant to both Dewey’s concrete and Hab-
ermas’s theoretical schema. the implication of this project is that social pathologies 
which can be described in the concrete and theorised in the abstract can be usefully 
analysed with the use of semiotics and pragmatics. the paper suggests an approach to 
understanding effects on Dewey’s ‘soul’, Habermas’s ‘communicative actors’ and Peirce’s 
‘interpretant.’ the approach is in terms of explaining the vastly complex and rapid 
movement and empirical ‘checking-out’ processes of the interpretant. the notion of this 
rapid subjectivity-orienting process enlists Peircean theory to understand the pathol-
ogies which Dewey and Habermas are both concerned with in their differing ways. 
‘lifeworld negotiation’ is offered as a term for the recalibration of subjectivity in a new 
lifeworld reality once rupture of a previous lifeworld has been repaired and subdued by 
political, social and associated communicative work. this paper is written in the spirit 
that it is not just philosophers who hold philosophies about the world. on the contrary 
everyone holds philosophies in their ways of thinking. one first needs to consider ex-
planations for the creation and management of that thinking before one can invoke the 
principle that: ‘…the point is to change it.’
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